跳到主要内容

analyzing-cyber-kill-chain 精选

'Analyzes intrusion activity against the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain

在 GitHub 打开

安装方式

cp -r skills/analyzing-cyber-kill-chain ~/.claude/skills/analyzing-cyber-kill-chain

把该 skill 目录放进客户端 skills 目录。不同客户端的目录可能不同,Claude Code 默认是 ~/.claude/skills/

整仓一次性获取:git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git

依赖与权限

  • 无需 API Key
  • 无需联网
  • 无外部命令依赖
  • 以上为按正文与 frontmatter 自动推断的信号,仅供参考;安装前建议先阅读原文。

SKILL.md 正文

来源 mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills@54a7988 · 许可 Apache-2.0 · 内容未修改

Analyzing Cyber Kill Chain

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Conducting post-incident analysis to determine how far an adversary progressed through an attack sequence
  • Designing layered defensive controls with the goal of interrupting attacks at the earliest possible phase
  • Producing threat intelligence reports that communicate attack progression to non-technical stakeholders

Do not use this skill as a standalone framework — combine with MITRE ATT&CK for technique-level granularity beyond what the 7-phase kill chain provides.

Prerequisites

  • Complete incident timeline with forensic artifacts mapped to specific adversary actions
  • MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix for technique-level mapping within each kill chain phase
  • Access to threat intelligence on the suspected adversary group's typical kill chain progression
  • Post-incident report or IR timeline from responding team

Workflow

Step 1: Map Observed Actions to Kill Chain Phases

The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain consists of seven phases. Map all observed adversary actions:

Phase 1 - Reconnaissance: Adversary gathers target information before attack.

  • Indicators: DNS queries from adversary IP, LinkedIn scraping, job posting analysis, Shodan scans of organization infrastructure

Phase 2 - Weaponization: Adversary creates attack tool (malware + exploit).

  • Indicators: Malware compilation timestamps, exploit document metadata, builder artifacts in malware samples

Phase 3 - Delivery: Adversary transmits weapon to target.

  • Indicators: Phishing emails, malicious attachments, drive-by downloads, USB drops, supply chain compromise

Phase 4 - Exploitation: Adversary exploits vulnerability to execute code.

  • Indicators: CVE exploitation events in application/OS logs, memory corruption artifacts, shellcode execution

Phase 5 - Installation: Adversary establishes persistence on target.

  • Indicators: New scheduled tasks, registry run keys, service installation, web shells, bootkits

Phase 6 - Command & Control (C2): Adversary communicates with compromised system.

  • Indicators: Beaconing traffic (regular intervals), DNS tunneling, HTTPS to uncommon domains, C2 framework signatures (Cobalt Strike, Sliver)

Phase 7 - Actions on Objectives: Adversary achieves goals.

  • Indicators: Data staging/exfiltration, lateral movement, ransomware execution, destructive activity

Step 2: Identify Phase Completion and Detection Points

Create a phase matrix for the incident:

Phase 1: Recon        → Completed (undetected)
Phase 2: Weaponize    → Completed (undetected — pre-attack)
Phase 3: Delivery     → Completed; phishing email bypassed SEG
Phase 4: Exploit      → Completed; CVE-2023-23397 exploited
Phase 5: Install      → DETECTED: EDR flagged scheduled task creation (attack stalled here)
Phase 6: C2           → Not achieved (installation blocked)
Phase 7: Objectives   → Not achieved

For each phase completed without detection, document the defensive control gap.

Step 3: Map to MITRE ATT&CK for Technique Detail

Each kill chain phase maps to multiple ATT&CK tactics:

  • Delivery → Initial Access (TA0001)
  • Exploitation → Execution (TA0002)
  • Installation → Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
  • C2 → Command and Control (TA0011)
  • Actions on Objectives → Exfiltration (TA0010), Impact (TA0040)

Within each phase, enumerate specific ATT&CK techniques observed and map to existing detections.

Step 4: Identify Courses of Action per Phase

For each phase, document applicable defensive courses of action (COAs):

  • Detect COA: What detection would alert on adversary activity in this phase?
  • Deny COA: What control would prevent the adversary from completing this phase?
  • Disrupt COA: What control would interrupt the adversary mid-phase?
  • Degrade COA: What control would reduce the adversary's effectiveness in this phase?
  • Deceive COA: What deception (honeypots, canary tokens) would expose activity in this phase?
  • Destroy COA: What active defense capability would neutralize adversary infrastructure?

Step 5: Produce Kill Chain Analysis Report

Structure findings as:

  1. Attack narrative (timeline of phases)
  2. Phase-by-phase analysis with evidence
  3. Detection point analysis (what worked, what failed)
  4. Defensive recommendation per phase prioritized by cost/effectiveness
  5. Control improvement roadmap

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
Kill ChainSequential model of adversary intrusion phases; breaking any link theoretically stops the attack
Courses of Action (COA)Defensive responses mapped to each kill chain phase: detect, deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, destroy
BeaconingRegular, periodic C2 check-in pattern from compromised host to adversary server; detectable by frequency analysis
Phase CompletionAdversary successfully finishes a kill chain phase and progresses to the next; defense-in-depth aims to prevent this
Intelligence Gain/LossAnalysis of whether detecting at Phase 5 (vs. Phase 3) reduced intelligence about adversary capabilities or intent

Tools & Systems

  • MITRE ATT&CK Navigator: Overlay kill chain phases with ATT&CK technique coverage for integrated analysis
  • Elastic Security EQL: Event Query Language for querying multi-phase attack sequences in Elastic SIEM
  • Splunk ES: Timeline visualization and correlation searches for kill chain phase sequencing
  • MISP: Kill chain tagging via galaxy clusters for structured incident event documentation

Common Pitfalls

  • Linear assumption: Adversaries don't always progress linearly — they may skip phases (weaponization already complete from previous campaign) or loop back (re-establish C2 after detection).
  • Ignoring Phases 1 and 2: Reconnaissance and weaponization occur before the defender has visibility. Intelligence about these phases requires external sources (OSINT, threat intelligence).
  • Missing insider threats: The kill chain was designed for external adversaries. Insider threats may skip directly to Phase 7 without traversing earlier phases.
  • Confusing with ATT&CK tactics: The 7-phase kill chain and 14 ATT&CK tactics are complementary but not directly equivalent. Maintain distinction to prevent analytic confusion.

质量与来源

所属仓库
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
仓库星标
3.4 万
最近更新
1 个月前
采集时间
今天
commit
54a798831d22
内容指纹
sha256:6ed56459c6dcb54
文件路径
skills/analyzing-cyber-kill-chain/SKILL.md

同仓库其它 Skill

查看全部 50 个
abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-team credential-access engagements after gaining a foothold or when triaging DPAPI blobs pulled from a host.
精选 mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills 3.4 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLICursor
abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc
Take over Active Directory accounts by writing attacker-controlled public keys to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) with pyWhisker, Whisker, or Certipy, then authenticate via PKINIT to recover the target's NT hash without a password reset. Use when BloodHound shows GenericWrite/GenericAll/AddKeyCredentialLink over a target, as a stealthier alternative to ForceChangePassword, during authorized red-team engagements.
精选 mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills 3.4 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLICursor
achieving-cmmc-level-2-compliance
Prepare a defense-contractor environment for CMMC Level 2 certification: scope CUI and FCI, implement the 110 NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 security requirements across 14 families, compute the SPRS score with the DoD Assessment Methodology, manage a compliant POA&M, and ready the organization for a C3PAO assessment. Use when an organization handles Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) under a DoD contract, when a contract carries DFARS clause 252.204-7012/7019/7020/7021, when preparing for or responding to a CMMC assessment, when computing or improving an SPRS score, when building a System Security Plan or POA&M for 800-171, or when scoping which systems are in the CUI boundary. Keywords: CMMC, CMMC Level 2, NIST 800-171, SP 800-171 Rev 2, CUI, FCI, SPRS, DFARS 7012, C3PAO, POA&M, System Security Plan, DoD Assessment Methodology, 110 controls, defense industrial base, DIB, FedRAMP equivalency.
精选 mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills 3.4 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLICursor
acquiring-disk-image-with-dd-and-dcfldd
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images with dd or dcfldd on a Linux forensic workstation, preserving evidence integrity through hash verification (MD5/SHA) during acquisition. Use when imaging a suspect drive, USB device, or memory card for investigation, preserving volatile disk evidence during incident response, or producing a verified copy for legal or law-enforcement proceedings before any destructive analysis.
精选 mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills 3.4 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLICursor
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse
Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3
精选 mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills 3.4 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLICursor
analyzing-android-malware-with-apktool
Perform static analysis of Android APK malware using apktool for resource decompilation, jadx for Java source recovery, and androguard for manifest inspection, dangerous permission-combination detection, and identification of obfuscated code, dynamic code loading, and reflection-based API calls. Use to statically triage a suspicious APK without executing it or to build mobile malware detection rules.
精选 mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills 3.4 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLICursor
agent-browser
Browser automation CLI for AI agents. Use when the user needs to interact with websites, including navigating pages, filling forms, clicking buttons, taking screenshots, extracting data, testing web apps, or automating any browser task. Triggers include requests to "open a website", "fill out a form", "click a button", "take a screenshot", "scrape data from a page", "test this web app", "login to a site", "automate browser actions", or any task requiring programmatic web interaction.
精选 shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice 6.7 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLI
presentation-structure
Knowledge about the presentation slide format, weight system, navigation, and section structure
精选 shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice 6.7 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLI
presentation-styling
Knowledge about CSS classes, component patterns, and syntax highlighting in the presentation
精选 shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice 6.7 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLI
vibe-to-agentic-framework
The conceptual framework behind the presentation — what "Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineering" means, why the journey is structured the way it is, and how every slide fits the narrative arc
精选 shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice 6.7 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLI
time-skill
Display the current time in Pakistan Standard Time (PKT, UTC+5). Use when the user asks for the current time, Pakistan time, or PKT.
精选 shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice 6.7 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLI
weather-fetcher
Instructions for fetching current weather temperature data for Dubai, UAE from Open-Meteo API
精选 shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice 6.7 万 原文
Claude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLI